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The mesh off conflicts in the eastern Congo has witnessed a slow deterioration over the past 
year. Internal displacement has continued apace, reaching 4,1 million people, more than in 
Syria and one of the highest levels ever recorded since the beginning of the various Congolese 
conflicts in 1993, with 550,000 displaced in the past three months alone. At the same time, 
armed groups have continued to splinter and proliferate. While none of that sounds novel to 
observers of the eastern Congo, a couple of new trends have emerged since our last mapping 
in 2015.  
Political turmoil caused by the uncertainty around President Kabila’s succession has begun to 
slowly affect conflict dynamics, influencing the rhetoric of some groups and quickening 
coalition formation among others, such as in Fizi and Beni territories. These developments have 
been accentuated by a national army increasingly under strain, in part due to a drop in real 
wages due to sharp inflation and a decline in morale. Moreover, in the wake of the Kamuina 
Nsapu crisis in the Kasai region, a significant number of army troops have been relocated there 
from the Kivus. 
While the eastern Congo is no longer the arena of muscular military intervention by its 
neighbors, the past two years have featured an intensification of small scale cross-border 
dynamics fuelling armed mobilization, such as in the Rwenzori mountains and along the border 
with Burundi, from where armed opposition groups have entered eastern DRC since Pierre 
Nkurunziza’s contested re-election in mid-2015. 
In this context, armed groups have continued to proliferate: in our newly launched Kivu 
Security Tracker (KST), we count around 120 in North and South Kivu provinces alone, most of 
them small in size and primarily ethno-centric, but increasingly enmeshed in an unstable web of 
coalitions, sometimes including wider political and business networks. Who are these groups? 
Where and why do they operate? This essay discusses the main trends shaping topography of 
armed groups in North Kivu and South Kivu in late 2017.  
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AN OVERVIEW OF ARMED MOBILIZATION 
Armed groups are spread across the two Kivus, concentrated in strategic areas such as the 
Semuliki Valley, the Ruzizi Plain or around the Virunga National Park. Smaller ones appear to be 
clustered in areas with high population density and fierce competition between armed groups. 
To the west, heading into the sparsely populated lowlands, groups seem to roam further afield, 
creating larger areas of influence.   
In late 2017, there were several important clusters of armed groups, which also coincide with 
hotspots in the conflict.  
The Lubero-Nyanzale-Kitchanga axis 
Since the Miriki massacre in January 2016, there has been a significant escalation of violence in 
southern Lubero and northern Rutshuru territories. This violence––which has featured Hutu 
armed groups opposed to those from the Nande, Nyanga, and Kobo communities––was 
compounded by the Sukola II offensive of the national army, the Forces armées de la 
République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), against the Rwandan Forces démocratiques de 
libération du Rwanda (FDLR) rebels in late 2015. As it had done elsewhere, the FARDC 
partnered with local armed groups, including Nduma Defense of Congo–Rénové (NDC-R), 
while the FDLR worked alongside Nyatura groups from the Congolese Hutu community. At the 
same time, a loose network of armed groups within the Nande community, the Mai-Mai 
Mazembe, emerged and initially worked with NDC-R against their perceived Hutu enemies.  
These tensions between the Congolese Hutu community and their neighbors have also 
cropped up in the chefferies (customary chiefdoms) of Bashali-Mokoto (northeastern Masisi) 
and Bwito (western Rutshuru) since at least mid-2016, when a new splinter faction broke off the 
FDLR, the Conseil national pour le rénouveau de la démocratie (CNRD)–Ubwiyunge led by 
Wilson Irategeka. Taking advantage of this split, the FARDC resumed operations against the 
FDLR and allied Nyatura militia, at times with CNRD support. 
Ever since, this area has been the theatre of constant low-level clashes involving FDLR, CRND, 
FARDC, the Alliances de patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS), and about a 
dozen different Nyatura factions, concentrated around population centers such as Kitchanga, 
Mweso and Nyanzale. Certain Nyatura and FDLR units, in turn, have continued to engage 
northwards with the NDC-R and Mazembe. Following a fall-out between the latter two, 
however, it is mostly Mazembe groups, in the shape of highly autonomous franchises, that 
continue fighting against Nyatura groups but also and increasingly against FARDC units. 
Taken together, these dynamics highlight the perils of counterinsurgency operations for the 
FARDC, as well as for its UN peacekeeping partners. Such endeavors often trigger spin-off 
conflicts and security vacuums––which in turn fuel armed mobilization and displacement.  
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Fizi-Uvira: A new coalit ion in an unstable neighborhood 
The Ruzizi Plain and the Moyens Plateaux of Uvira host around 15 different Mai-Mai and so-
called local defense militia. Most of these recruit within the Fuliiro community, with some 
groups made up of Barundi and Bavira. This conflict ecosystem has existed for years. Over the 
past two years, however, we have observed two main developments: the spill-over of a new 
Burundian political crisis, and the emergence of a new Mai-Mai coalition coming from Fizi, 
making Uvira town the hub of overlapping conflict dynamics. 
The political crisis in Bujumbura, evolving around mass protest, contested elections and a failed 
coup d’état in mid-2015, triggered a new generation of Burundian armed mobilization in 
eastern Congo. Adding to the two armed branches of the Forces nationales de libération 
(FNL)––today led respectively by Nzabampema and Nibizi––present in the area for many years, 
two new groups have stood out: the Résistance pour un état de droit (RED)-Tabara (since 2015, 
although based on precursor groups) and the Forces républicaines du Burundi (FOREBU, now 
called Forces populaires du Burundi, since 2016). Their new rear-bases in eastern Congo have 
in turn increased the involvement of the Burundian government through joint operations with 
the FARDC, secret incursions, and the arming of several local Congolese armed groups as 
proxies. 
None of these developments, however, were as dramatic as the emergence of a new, broad 
rebel coalition in late 2016, the Coalition nationale du people pour la souveraineté du Congo 
(CNPSC) led by veteran militia commander William Amuri Yakutumba and recruiting mostly 
within the Bembe community. Within several months, it inflicted heavy casualties on the 
Congolese army, briefly seized important gold mining areas, and stitched together a coalition 
of over ten armed groups (although some are relatively insignificant). While their largest 
operation––an attack on Uvira, the second-largest town in South Kivu––failed in September 
2017, the group operates across large swathes of territory ranging from the shores of Lake 
Tanganyika to Maniema province.  
Although it remains unclear how this coalition gained such momentum, the declining morale of 
the FARDC, an influx of money from kidnapping ransoms and mining revenues, as well as 
alleged connections across Lake Tanganyika may have contributed to the CNPSC’s rise.  
Beni terr itory 
The DRC-Uganda border between Lake Edward and Lake Albert has historically been known 
both for its lucrative trade networks and the presence of multiple, often overlapping armed 
groups. In recent years, three dynamics have been fuelling an uptick in violence in the area: an 
increasingly hostile Islamist Ugandan rebellion, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF); networks 
led by former members of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie––
Kisangani/Mouvement de libération (RCD-K/ML) rebellion; and militia that recruit among the 
local ethnic minorities.  
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While many accounts attribute the beginning of the recent violence to the Sukola I operations 
against the ADF, which began in late 2013, the escalation in armed group activity began in 
earnest several years prior and coincided with the defection to the opposition of Mbusa 
Nyamwisi, the former head of the RCD-K/ML and a long-time minister in President Kabila’s 
government. While Mbusa’s role remains unclear, numerous ex-APC officers are currently active 
as leaders of armed groups around Beni––for instance, Sibenda and Kithikyolo––and CRG 
research has determined extensive ex-APC involvement in the initial massacres around Beni in 
2013 and 2014.  
This does not mean that the ADF are not involved. In response to the FARDC offensive, the 
ADF has engaged in indiscriminate killings and abductions of civilians, as well as in more 
targeted attacks of local chiefs and officials. The arrest of its leader Jamil Mukulu in 2015 
appears to have furthered the ADF’s radicalization. But it is crucial to highlight its connections 
with other groups: During its more than twenty years in the Rwenzori area, the ADF has built 
strong ties with other armed actors in the area, including those led by ex-APC and local militias, 
such as those around Mayangose and in Bambuba-Kisiki. 
Confusing matters further, members of the FARDC itself have fuelled instability in the area. 
CRG and UN investigations have documented the involvement of army officers in the 
massacres, and controversy surrounds the involvement of Bwambale Kakolele, a former APC 
officer turned government official, in groups in the area, such as the Mai-Mai Vivuya. 
Since 2016, a shift in conflict dynamics in Beni has taken place, with several new armed groups 
appearing with an explicitly anti-Kabila rhetoric. While most of them claim to be protecting 
civilians against the massacres around Beni, they have also launched successful attacks on the 
Beni prison, as well as against FARDC and MONUSCO. At the same time, the ADF have 
become increasingly aggressive, participating in attacks close to the Ugandan border as 
recently as October 2017.  
 
DISTILLING TRENDS I––THE POLITICIZATION OF CONFLICT 
Even though most armed groups are based in remote, rural areas a thousand miles from 
Kinshasa, their leaders are keen followers of national politics and social media has multiplied 
the spread of news, tracts and documents. It is not surprising, therefore, that the current 
political turmoil around the delaying of elections increasingly impacts on conflict dynamics.  
Perhaps the clearest impact has been on the largest belligerent in the region: the FARDC. 
Political uncertainty, along with a budget crisis and high inflation, has affected salary payments 
and operational funds for the army, thus eroding morale. While sporadic military operations still 
take place, Sukola I and Sukola II have been scaled down and some units have been 
redeployed to the Kasais to deal with insurgencies there. In addition, all major policies 
intended at dealing with the conflict––from the latest demobilization program to negotiations 
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with armed groups and donor-driven stabilization––have ground to a halt.  
These factors appear to have encouraged armed groups to take the initiative, attacking prisons 
and forming ramshackle coalitions. The CNPSC in Fizi, its allies among the Kalehe-based Raia 
Mutomboki, as well as new Nyatura and Mai-Mai coalitions in North Kivu have been egged on 
by the government’s perceived illegitimacy since December 2016––some armed group leaders 
even claiming this rendered their own struggle more legitimate. 
It is in this particular political climate that the rhetoric of armed mobilization has shifted from its 
traditional stance against Rwanda––which used to be perceived as the main threat by many––to 
a much more pronounced anti-Kabila tone over the past year: when several Raia Mutomboki 
factions took control of the main road in Bunyakiri in September 2017, they announced they 
would stay until Kabila left. Moreover, the CNPSC’s rhetoric is embedded in decidedly anti-
government sentiment and, on the highly symbolic date of December 19 2016, Mai-Mai Kilalo 
attacked a police station and the adjacent MONUSCO base in Butembo. 
It is still unclear, however, to what degree politicians have increased their involvement in armed 
group mobilization due to the crisis in Kinshasa. There are credible reports linking both 
opposition and government officials to groups across the Kivus, but little rigorous 
documentation of this nexus. Nonetheless, if past elections serve as precedent, an escalation in 
conflict dynamics in the coming years would not come as a big surprise. 
 
DISTILLING TRENDS II––NETWORKED FRAGMENTATION 
A key feature of eastern Congo’s landscape of armed groups continues to be the high levels of 
fragmentation: There are around 120 armed groups, compared with roughly 70 two years ago. 
Most of these are small and very localized, but a few control significant areas. While 
fragmentation continues, it also plays out in an increasingly networked fashion, resulting in 
broad, unstable coalitions. 
A good example is the cluster evolving around the FDLR. While this Rwandan rebellion has 
declined precipitously in size––from around 7,000 a decade ago to approximately 1,000 today–
–it is still probably one of the largest armed groups in the Congo, and has been able to stitch 
together partnerships with many other local militia. While the emergence of the CNRD initially 
divided the roughly fifteen Nyatura factions, most of them quickly realigned with the FDLR by 
late 2016. Despite infighting and leadership struggles, the Nyatura continue to form a bulwark 
of Congolese Hutu militia surrounding the FDLR’s strategic hideouts. These armed groups also 
bear the brunt of the fighting against CNRD and FARDC around Kitchanga, as well as against 
the various Mazembe branches north of Nyanzale.  
Another example recently emerged in South Kivu, with the Mai-Mai Yakutumba forming the 
anchor for a dozen satellite groups within the CNPSC coalition. As mentioned above, this 
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coalition is mostly composed of Bembe Mai-Mai groups and other affiliates such as She 
Assani’s Malaika group, stretching from Fizi territory into Maniema province. 
The resurgence in Burundian influence has accentuated this proliferation in Fizi and Uvira 
territories, making it even more difficult to maintain stable alliances in Uvira territory. Both 
Bujumbura and its armed opposition have reached out to Fuliiro armed groups, although the 
latter have responded with a mix of suspicion and opportunism. In addition, FARDC operations 
against militia leaders and internal feuds have led to constant mutations of armed groups. 
Other armed groups appear to be networked on a more symbolic level, drawing on tradition 
and ethnicity to maintain loose networks. This is the case for the Mai-Mai Mazembe, a highly 
decentralized militia cluster from the Nande community, as well as for Raia Mutomboki factions 
in Shabunda, where a new coalition of roughly ten groups was recently formed, and among the 
various Mai-Mai Kifuafua factions in southern Walikale and Masisi territories. 
In sum, recent attempts at coalition building form a counterpoint to the continuing 
fragmentation. In sum, recent attempts at coalition building form a counterpoint to the 
continuing fragmentation. Despite the continued splintering of armed groups, the national 
political turmoil, combined with the gravitational pull of some larger groups, has helped fuel 
the creation of new, dynamic, but not durable networks. 
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METHODOLOGICAL NOTES 
Mapping non-state armed groups is, like many other illicit phenomena, a sensitive task and will 
inevitably involve imprecisions. New armed groups pop up every month, and their 
deployments are in constant flux. The aim here is stimulate conversation about the complexity 
of the conflict and armed group activity in the eastern Congo. We welcome comments and 
criticism; indeed, this will help us improve the next, updated version. 
This map is the result of extensive fieldwork conducted by a network of researchers based 
throughout North and South Kivu, and has benefited from several rounds of internal and 
external reviews by experts on conflict dynamics in this region.  
The map depicts ‘areas of influence’ rather than absolute control. While some armed groups 
exert effective control over an area, others may be able to exert substantial influence over 
larger zones but lack full control over those areas. Influence consists of the frequent 
deployment of troops and the ability to carry out significant attacks. Hence the size of an 
armed group area does not necessarily correspond to its strength.  
Moreover, we do not include all armed actors. The groups included in this mapping have the 
following qualities: a) they have a differentiated organizational structure and an identity, b) they 
seek to assert some form of control over a geographic area, c) they refer to some––genuine or 
pretended––ideology, and d) and they employ violence regularly or as a technique of 
governance. While banditry continues to thrive in parts of the Kivu, we do not consider such 
gangs as armed groups. Nonetheless, we included actors ranging from micro-militias with no 
more than 20 combatants to large, sophisticated groups such as the FDLR. 
This map represents a snapshot of the situation in October 2017. 
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